law that would force government to improve the interagency coordination process. An initiative of this magnitude could take years to realize, may not be necessary, and cannot guarantee progress. In the absence of a congressional mandate, grass root initiatives for coordination should continue to be developed and implemented between the national security agencies. This paper will review ongoing initiatives to standardize the development of national security professionals, identify and review current programs designed to maximize the interagency coordination process, and make recommendations on how to improve interagency coordination.
THE INTERAGENCY COORDINATION PROCESS: WHAT WE CAN DO NOW
The current interagency coordination process for national security issues involves bureaucracies, and hence can be inherently characterized as slow, stove-piped, and encumbered by cultural differences. Many professionals throughout government and civilian institutions argue that there is a critical need for a "Goldwater-Nichols-type" law that would force government to improve the interagency coordination process. There are a myriad of efforts underway designed to improve interagency coordination on the scale enjoyed by the Department of Defense (DoD) following the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and its mandates for inter-service coordination. 1 These efforts are valuable and necessary as they may result in both immediate and long-term improvements. However, passage of a law and realization of any subsequent improvements could take years, not least because oversight and funding responsibilities of individual national security agencies fall under multiple congressional committees. In the absence of a congressional mandate, national security leaders must continue to develop and implement initiatives across the elements of national power in order to improve the coordination abilities of the system's center of gravity. In the case of the interagency national security coordination process, the center of gravity is human capital in the form of our national security professionals, defined for the purpose of this project as "policymakers and professionals within governmental departments and agencies, both civilian and military, who are responsible for protecting and advancing the interests of the United States." 2 This paper will review ongoing efforts to standardize the development of national security professionals, identify and review current programs intended to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the interagency coordination process, and make recommendations on how to improve interagency coordination.
Laws and policies provide direction for improvement; however, it takes skilled and seasoned professionals to make the possible a reality. The interagency coordination process is no exception. The challenge is knowing how and when to interact and gaining and maintaining a useful level of proficiency. Proficiency is the ability to represent the position of a particular agency while simultaneously achieving the common national objectives. Most national security professionals, whether they are military or civilian, lack the opportunity or often the incentive to become proficient in the interagency coordination process. This is directly attributable to the magnitude of the system, cultural differences between agencies, lack of knowledge of the responsibilities and competencies of other agencies, and stove-pipes in some cases established by leaders. Under the current professional development system, it is a wonder how our senior national security professionals ever reach proficiency. It is arguable that based on interagency actions during the stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and the rebuilding of Iraq that many senior national security professionals lack proficiency or perhaps choose not to use their proficiency toward common national objectives, choosing instead to remain mired in their own cultural bias. While it may be too late to overcome completely most of the cultural biases ingrained in current senior national security professionals, there is a target of opportunity among today's mid and junior level officers and officials. How will they learn to work outside their respective agency or experience base? How will they gain proficiency now so that when called upon they can lead? In today's global society, there is great risk in waiting for national security professionals to gain proficiency through on-the-job training. In order to achieve the tipping point in the interagency coordination process, national security professionals at all levels must actively pursue improvement in their ability to work across all interagency cultures.
President George W. Bush issued his first directive, National Security Presidential Directive 1 (NSPD-1), on 13 February 2001. NSPD-1 established President Bush's architecture for the National Security Council, using the National Security Act of 1947 as the basis, and setting forth the interagency coordination process for his administration. 3 Neither this directive, nor any that followed, established accountability for a cabinet or sub-cabinet official not conforming to the President's vision of interagency coordination, nor did the administration institute a system to ensure officials achieve and maintain proficiency as National Security Personnel.
Successfully bringing together multiple agencies and departments to establish common objectives is not an easy task. Success in interagency coordination requires close and sincere cooperation among U.S. Government agencies in order to integrate all instruments of national power toward satisfaction of national objectives. 4 The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSP-WOT) describes the process well, stating, "The GWOT requires a joint, interagency effort in support of a sustained global war plan. DoD needs to achieve unprecedented levels of coordination (at both the strategic and operational levels) to effectively deal with this complex requirement and accompanying interdependence. This effort also requires an end to unilateral "stove-piping" of actions within departments, agencies, and staff directorates." 5 As implied in the title, this statement is specific to the War on Terror, but the emphasis on interagency interdependence and the imperative for coordination has clear application across the spectrum of national security challenges and opportunities requiring integration of the diplomatic, information, military, and economic elements of national power.
How the interagency coordination process will evolve is difficult to predict, but what is clear is the epistemological premise that we can and must learn from our recent mistakes in order to prepare for the future. An excellent illustration of that process is in the short story "The Defence of Duffers Drift." British Major General Sir Earnest D.
Swinton wrote this story under the pseudonym, Lieutenant Backsight Forethought, while still a Captain and soon after his service in South Africa. Published in 1905, the short story concerns a British lieutenant serving in the Boer War. 6 The Lieutenant and his party of 50 Non Commissioned Officers and men receive a mission to defend Duffer's Drift, an important river crossing. The protagonist dreams of a disastrous initial defense due to lack of preparation and understanding of the situation. The Lieutenant then dreams of finding himself back in the same location with no recollection of the failed mission except for the knowledge of lessons learned. In all, the Lieutenant has six dreams and twenty-two lessons learned before successfully defending the Drift. The preface to this book gives incredible insight into the process of preparing for the future through vulnerability analysis. In the preface, Captain Swinton writes:
The dreams are not anticipations, but merely a record of petty experiences against one kind of enemy in one kind of country only, with certain deductions based thereupon. But from these, given the conditions, it is not difficult to deduce the variations suitable for other countries, or for those occasions when a different foe with different methods of fighting and different weapons has to be met. 7 The lessons we have learned over the last six years since 11 September 2001 are far from petty. Yet the simplicity of "The Defence of Duffer's Drift" makes the problem clearer; we must learn from past errors and anticipate future vulnerabilities. Future interagency coordination challenges will be anything but standard. Each challenge will have its own actors, its own nuances. Each will require just as much, if not more, integration of the elements of national power. The one aspect certain to remain constant is the need to work together to maintain our national security and status.
While there is a significant difference between 51 men defending a river crossing in Africa at the turn of the twentieth century and the interagency coordination process, there are also substantive similarities. Our nation's ability to adapt based on lessons learned and vulnerabilities identified will affect the number of dreams, or nightmares, we encounter. It is not only possible and desirable, but also imperative, that we identify and address weaknesses in the interagency national security coordination process. Many lessons learned from the past six years have already translated to initiatives throughout our government to reduce "stove-piping" and parochialism addressed in the NMSP-WOT.
Compounding the challenge in addressing the need to improve the interagency coordination process is its complexity. "Interagency Coordination" is as common today as the phrase "Revolution in Military Affairs" was in the 90s, and most references are oriented toward fixing the process. A recent Google search of "Interagency
Coordination" provided about 142,000 hits, indicating substantial interest in the national security and academic communities (c.f. a search for "Revolution in Military Affairs"
which resulted in about 93,600 hits). 8 Interagency coordination is a term widely discussed, yet there is little doctrinal reference to the term outside the Department of Defense. Joint Doctrine defines interagency coordination as "The coordination that occurs between agencies of the US Government (USG), including the Department of Defense (DoD), for the purpose of accomplishing an objective." 9 In today's global society, this definition would fit just about any action taken to achieve any objective. The breadth of this definition and the potential variables that apply make it nearly impossible to achieve a seamless process. Therefore, it is imperative that all national security professionals continue to develop initiatives that incrementally move us toward success.
Ongoing Efforts National Strategy for the Development of Security Professionals
The most significant and recent effort to improve the interagency coordination 2008, this plan had not made it out of staffing. 13 The inability of agencies to execute a presidential order exemplifies the inefficiency of our interagency coordination process.
The Implementation Plan could provide the means for the current administration to answer the deafening calls for interagency coordination reform. In concept, it addresses many of the same issues found in the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The plan hinges future successful reform on some of the same areas that were a springboard for DoD's 1986 joint reform; namely training, education, and professional development. It is unclear whether this plan will provide sufficient authority and pressure in two other areas critical to Goldwater-Nichols' success: budget and promotions. One advantage to an administration-initiated directive, rather than a reliance on legislative action, is the absence of congressional politics that could encumber its approval. However, it is undetermined whether a major reform such as the NSPD Implementation Plan, initiated by a lame duck president, will garner enough support to survive an administration change.
National Defense University
The 18 The establishment of JIACGs and the training done by NDU is an excellent example that highlights the ongoing grassroots movement taken by Combatant Commands, Departments, agencies, and academia to coordinate the elements of national power.
Interagency Coordination Venues
There are many conferences like ITEA's Interagency Coordination Symposia. So many in fact, it is nearly impossible for the average national security professional, engrossed in his or her day-to-day activities, to keep proper track. These conferences, power presently exists, it does note that the conference will be attempting to answer the questions "Are we as a country properly organized and equipped to conduct effective security strategy in the 21st century? Is the primary issue one of structure and process or is it perhaps more related to individuals and leadership?" 19 The premise of this paper is that while structure and process may be flawed, the primary issue in interagency coordination -or at least the issue that can be most expeditiously addressed --relates Conference provide a venue for policy level discussion, ultimately affecting other events such as the GSC. Each is important and yet they do not define how the national security professional properly prepares to function in or at the venues. To significantly impact cultural differences and stove-pipes, new initiatives must focus on these issues. The following case study provides a review of a USSOCOM initiative undertaken to educate, train, and emplace professionals across the interagency in order to enhance USSOCOM's ability to conduct interagency coordination.
USSOCOM's Interagency Partnership Program (IAPP): A Case Study.
Cultural differences between the military and the other elements of national power have gained significant exposure since 9/11. While most of these differences existed in some form, it was not until the attack on our homeland that they gained prominence. Training is the second strategy used in overcoming cultural differences. In each IAPP success, the SOST Chiefs clearly understood the USSOCOM mission. The SOST Chief's ability to articulate how that mission could help the gaining agency was essential in brokering the partnership. If the SOST Chief did not fully understand cultural differences before entering the agency, the chance for success significantly diminished.
One tool used to train SOST members was the JSOU Special Operations Forces
Interagency Collaboration Course (SOFIACC). This five-day course addresses the cultural differences, coordination processes, and organizational dynamics of the interagency team partners and other relevant organizations. The course ends with an interactive problem-solving exercise in which students role-play members of a working group tasked to develop a concept for employment of SOF with other government agencies to mitigate growing instability in a foreign country. 33 All SOST personnel are required to attend this course. In many cases, the SOST Chiefs have been able to get agency counterparts to attend. To date JSOU has held seven SOFIACC's. Of the 212 students attending, 75 have been from 11 non-military departments or agencies. 34 Another training strategy implemented to reduce cultural differences is the SOCOM Combatant Command Course taught by JSOU at the USSOCOM headquarters. This course covers in detail USSOCOM's GWOT role. All SOST personnel are required to attend this course to ensure they are able to articulate USSOCOM's mission to their gaining agency. All agency representatives assigned to USSOCOM also attend this course.
Project Horizon: A Case Study.
Effective interagency coordination initiatives are not specific to DoD. In fact, the 35 Project Horizon brought together senior executives from across the U.S. Government departments, agencies and National Security Council staff to explore ways to improve U.S. Government interagency coordination. The Project's primary analysis tool was scenario-based planning. 36 The basis of this initiative is the idea that while agencies share highly interrelated goals, they lack coordinated plans to achieve them. 37 This creates both strategic vulnerabilities and operational inefficiencies similar to those we have experienced in the recent past. This project exemplifies how motivated leaders, from across the interagency, have the ability to improve the interagency coordination process.
The purpose of the project is to develop strategic interagency capabilities the U.S.
Government should consider investing in, provide participating agencies with a scenario-planning toolset, and provide a starting point for an institutionalized interagency planning process. 38 The A common argument against increasing the number of civilians is availability.
Many departments and agencies cannot afford to send their most precious commodity (personnel) away for a yearlong school. Departments and agencies must overcome this mindset if any education system, to include the one described in the National Strategy for the Development of Security Professionals, stands a chance at working. One possible solution to the shortage caused by sending a civilian employee to a DoD school is for DoD to provide a military officer of similar grade to the agency in a fellowship status for that period. This officer should follow the fellowship with attendance at a SSC or pay grade 04 equivalent, thereby bringing his interagency experience to the classroom. This would provide both DoD and the department or agency sending the civilian to school with a better educated national security professional. This of course merely shifts the personnel issue from the non-DoD element to DoD. However, DoD is in a better position than most departments and agencies to absorb this cost.
Linking National Security Professional Qualification to Promotion
If the NSPD implementation plan is approved, DoD should specify in its subsequent plan that all officers be qualified as national security professional before becoming eligible for promotion to Brigadier General. DoD should model this requirement after the current joint qualification requirement and outline it in conjunction with the NSPD implementation plan. The requirements to be designated a DoD national security professional should be easier to obtain then that required to be joint qualified, primarily due to the potential availability of multiple venues for military officers at the grade of 05 and 06.
SSC Interagency Civilian Noon Time Lectures (NTL)
Each SSC should implement a NTL series that encompasses department or agency briefings by civilian students. These briefings would be similar to the U.S. Army
War College International Fellowship NTL series. For those departments or agencies that do not have students in the school but have professionals on the staff they too should provide a NTL.
Conclusion
The development of programs like IAPP and fora such as ITEA's Interagency
Coordination Symposia serve to bring the elements of national power together at one Commission had in mind when they noted, "The massive departments and agencies that prevailed in the great struggles of the twentieth century must work together in new ways, so that all the instruments of national power can be combined." 47 Ultimately, the Nation needs proficient national security professionals working under the direction of proficient leaders willing to hold the national security apparatus accountable.
Developing those professionals is a critical task and must be the focus of all levels of our national security apparatus. Whether that development occurs at a grand scale because of the President's Executive Order establishing a National Strategy for the Development of Security Professionals or on a small scale through greater interaction at DoD's Senior Service Colleges, ultimately it must occur if we are to organize the elements of national power into one cohesive group. It is imperative that we do what we can now.
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